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Bennett: A Look Back at the Year in Health Law

A Look Back at the Year in Health Law
Jeffrey R. Bennett*
1997 was another fascinating year in health law and the health
care industry. In a year marked by the continued criminalization of the industry, thoughts of 1997 will probably call to mind
the indelible image of federal agents carrying boxes of documents from Columbia/HCA facilities and Columbia's subsequent fall from grace.1 1997 was also a year of peculiar events.
In August, for example, the American Medical Association
("AMA") agreed to allow Sunbeam Corporation to include an
"AMA Seal of Approval" on some of its home-care products.2
The AMA's top executive and four senior staffers eventually
lost their jobs over the ill-fated agreement. In short, 1997 was
just another year in the seemingly eternal evolution of the
American health care system.
This Article presents a survey of some of 1997's highlights and
low-lights in four major areas of health law: Medicare, antitrust,
taxation, and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"). Although not a comprehensive review, it provides
a general overview of the major trends, cases, and legislation in
each of the aforementioned areas.
I.

MEDICARE

Without question, the hottest Medicare issues of 1997 revolved around the federal government's relentless attempts to
control fraud and abuse in federal health care programs. A
year-end report from the Office of the Inspector General of the
* Mr. Bennett is an associate with the law firm of Epstein, Becker & Green in
Washington, D.C. where he practices health law. Mr. Bennett received his Bachelor
of Arts in International Studies and Economics from West Virginia University, his
Juris Doctor from the Ohio State University College of Law, and his Master of Laws
in health law from Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The author would like
to thank his wife, Angela Bennett, for her love, support, and encouragement and his
parents, Joseph and Linda Bennett, for always believing in him. He would also like to
thank Professor Joan Krause and Ellen Luepke for their editorial comments and
suggestions.
1. See generally, Daniel W. Roslokken, Columbia/HCA Under Siege, MANAGED
HEALTH CARE, Dec. 1997, at 34.
2. See 1997 Year in Review, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 22-29, 1997, at 52, 54.
3. See id.
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Department of Health and Human Services boasted that "an aggressive assault on Medicare fraud, waste, and abuse produced
$7.6 billion in savings in fiscal 1997 and removed nearly 3,000
'unsuitable' health care providers from the system."' 4 These savings included an unprecedented $1.2 billion recovered through
criminal and civil investigations.
The government also expanded its Operation Restore Trust
("ORT") initiative in 1997.6 Originally, ORT targeted fraud
only in the home health care, durable medical equipment, and
nursing home industries, and was limited to five states: New
York, Pennsylvania, California, Florida, and Texas.7 On the eve
of ORT's March 31, 1997 sunset date, the Clinton Administration expanded ORT into twelve new states and expanded its focus to four additional areas of fraud: clinical laboratories,
psychiatric hospitals, community mental health centers, and rural health clinics. In addition to the expansion of ORT, three
other fraud and abuse developments in 1997 warrant special attention. The Health Care Finance Administration ("HCFA")
released proposed "Stark II" regulations, Congress passed two
controversial Medicare provisions in the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an interesting opinion interpreting the False Claims Act.
A.

Proposed Stark II Regulations

The original Stark law, now known as "Stark I," was enacted
in 1989 and prohibited physicians from referring Medicare and
Medicaid patients to clinical laboratories with which the physicians had a prohibited financial relationship. 9 Stark 1110 expanded this self-referral prohibition to include ten additional
"designated health services."" Stark II took effect on January 1,
4. Medicare:Fraud Crackdown Recoups $7.6 Billion, HEALTH LINE, Dec. 11, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Health Library, Medical and Health News CURNWS File.
5. See id.
6. See Expanded OperationRestore Trust to Target More Providersin More States,
Health Care Daily (BNA) Mar. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAHLT File.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1989) (the self-referral prohibition laws are known as
"Stark" laws in reference to their principal author, Rep. Fortney Stark (D-Cal.)).
10. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 [hereinafter "OBRA"],
§ 13562, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 596-605 (1993) (amending 43 U.S.C.
§ 1395nn).
11. See OBRA § 13562, 107 Stat. at 596, 604.
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1995, but HCFA did not issue proposed regulations until January 9, 1998.12 In the interim, health care providers struggled to
comply with the expanded statutory prohibitions by relying on
regulations promulgated for Stark I. However, issues unique to
the ten newly designated health services have left providers
guessing about the legality of many common business
arrangements.
Stark II is an immensely complex piece of legislation, and
many attorneys have suggested that the proposed regulations
raise more questions than they answer. 13 Although the proposed regulations do not have any legal effect until they are officially adopted, they offer insight into the government's view on
a number of critical issues, and several of the provisions represent a significant departure from the health care industry's interpretation of the Stark II prohibitions. Specifically, the proposed
regulations contain several definitional provisions which may
substantially alter the industry's delivery of health care.
One of the most significant definitional provisions of the proposed regulations defines the "designated health services" to
which the Stark II referral prohibition applies. 14 In general, the
definitions follow those used for Medicare Part B coverage purposes. 5 However, HCFA specifically stated in the proposed
regulations that designated health services include those services
which are components of other services or which are subsumed
within another service category. 16 For example, although skilled
nursing services are not designated health services, the fact that
a skilled nursing facility may provide services that are designated health services (such as laboratory services) means that
physician referrals to a skilled nursing facility may be prohibited
by Stark 11.17
The proposed regulations also further define "financial relationships" under Stark II. The statute declares that an ownership or investment interest "includes an interest in an entity that
12. See Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships, 63 Fed. Reg. 1659 (1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411,
424, 435, and 455) [hereinafter "Physicians' Referrals"].
13. See Impact of Stark II ProposalStudied; GAO to Review PATH Audits of Hospitals, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 131 (Jan. 22, 1998).
14. See Physicians' Referrals, supra note 12, at 1664.
15. See HCFA Expands, Clarifies Self-Referral Prohibition in Proposed Rule, 7
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 299, 300 (Feb. 19, 1998).
16. See Physicians' Referrals, supra note 12, at 1664.
17. See HCFA Expands, Clarifies Self-Referral Prohibition in Proposed Rule,
supra note 15, at 300.
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holds an ownership or investment interest in any entity providing the designated health service. ' 18 The proposed regulations
state that a "financial relationship" includes any ownership or
investment interest in an entity, "no matter how many levels removed from a direct interest."'19 Therefore, under the proposed regulations, physicians may not own or invest in
companies that own or invest in other companies to which the
physician refers patients for designated health services.2 °
Physician group practices may qualify for various exceptions
to the referral prohibitions, and the proposed regulations make
significant changes to these provisions. For example, under the
Stark I regulations, a group practice must be composed of one
legal entity to qualify for the group practice exception.21 Under
the proposed regulations, however, a group practice composed
of individual professional corporations owned by physicians
could qualify as a group practice.22 The proposed regulations
also confirm that hospitals may own and operate group
practices.23
Finally, the proposed regulations would also change the definition of group practice by eliminating the inclusion of independent contractors as "members" of the group.2 4 This may
benefit some groups because to qualify as a group practice,
members of the group must "personally conduct no less that 75
percent of the physician-patient encounters. ' 25 Under the proposed Stark II regulations, the services of independent contractors would not be counted when making this determination.2 6
However, contract physicians would not be able to oversee the
provision of ancillary services for purposes of the in-office ancillary services exception because those services must be either directly furnished or directly supervised by a member of the
group.27
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn.
19. See Physicians' Referrals, supra note 12, at 1664.
20. See HCFA Expands, Clarifies Self-Referral Prohibition in Proposed Rule,
supra note 15, at 300.
21. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (1997).
22. See Physicians' Referrals, supra note 12, at 1687.
23. See id. at 1689.
24. See id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(4)(A)(v).
26. See Physicians' Referrals, supra note 12, at 1687.
27. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b) (1997).
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B.

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ("BBA") 28 includes two extremely controversial Medicare provisions. First, it imposes a
new civil money penalty for violations of the Medicare and
Medicaid anti-kickback law.29 Second, the statute includes a
provision that allows physicians to privately contract with Medicare beneficiaries if the physicians agree to forgo Medicare reimbursement for all services rendered to any Medicare patient
for two years.3 °
The new civil money penalty provision allows the government
to recover treble damages plus $50,000 for each violation of the
anti-kickback law. 31 Before the enactment of the BBA civil
monetary penalty provision, although the government occasionally obtained large monetary settlements from health care providers, the government's only statutory remedies for antikickback violations in the absence of voluntary settlements were
criminal prosecution or exclusion from federal health care programs. 32 The new civil money penalty provision requires a lower
burden of proof than the criminal sanctions, and because cases
brought under the anti-kickback statute typically involve allegations of numerous anti-kickback violations, the $50,000 per violation sanction gives the government unprecedented leverage in
settlement negotiations. If a physician chooses to forgo a settlement offer from the government, litigating and losing a case
under the new civil money penalty provision could easily lead to
financial ruin for the physician. Some health care attorneys believe that the new civil money penalty will dramatically increase
the number of anti-kickback cases, and some have expressed
concern that the government will use the potentially massive
sanctions in a coercive manner.33
The second controversial Medicare provision in the BBA allows physicians to privately contract with Medicare beneficiaries
28. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4304, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
29. See id. § 4304, 111. Stat. at 383-84.
30. See id. § 4304, Ill. Stat. at 439-42.
31. See id. § 4304, Ill. Stat. at 383-84. This civil money penalty provision is similar
to the civil money penalty available under the False Claims Act, but is far more
expansive.
32. See Budget's Anti-Fraud, Abuse Provisions Build on Last Year's Health Reform Law, Health Care Daily (BNA) Aug. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAHLT File.
33. See id.
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for services that would otherwise be covered by Medicare.34
Pursuant to that provision, physicians may enter into a private
contract with a Medicare beneficiary only if the physician also
executes an affidavit agreeing not to submit any claims to Medicare for any Medicare beneficiary for a two-year period beginning on the date the affidavit is signed.
Representative William Archer (R-Texas) and Senator Jon
Kyl (R-Arizona) have introduced legislation that would abolish
the two-year moratorium on Medicare participation and allow
providers to contract with beneficiaries on a claim-by-claim basis. 36 Proponents of the legislation argue that the two-year prohibition limits patient choice and would actually limit access to
health care by further restricting the number of physicians who
treat Medicare beneficiaries.37 On the other hand, critics charge
that eliminating the two-year exclusion would effectively create
a two-tiered system for Medicare services.38 Individuals with
lower incomes would have less access to physicians than those
with higher incomes because physicians could simply choose 39
to
contract with patients who could pay more for their services.
C. The False Claims Act
In an interesting case arising under the False Claims Act
("FCA"),4 ° the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in October
of 1997 that providers who falsify certifications of compliance
with Medicare regulations face potential liability under the
FCA. 41 Relator James Thompson brought a qui tam action
against Columbia/HCA alleging Medicare fraud.42 Thompson
alleged that Columbia violated the FCA by submitting Medicare
34. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4507(a), 111 Stat. 251,
439-41 (1997).
35. See id. § 4507(a), Ill. Stat. at 440.
36. See CBO Says Contracting Change Could Increase Fraud But Impact Uncertain, Health Care Daily (BNA) , Nov. 3, 1997 available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAHLT File.
37. See ContractingProvision in Budget Law Called a 'Flaw' and Invasion of Privacy, Health Care Daily (BNA), Nov. 5, 1997 available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAHLT File.
38. See id.
39. See Administration, Members of Congress Air Views on Private Contracting
Proposals, Health Care Daily (BNA), Feb. 28, 1998 available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAHLT File.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3729 (1997).
41. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125
F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1997).
42. See id. at 900.
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claims for services rendered in violation of the Medicare antikickback statute and the Stark laws. 43 The district court dismissed Thompson's complaint for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that claims for services rendered in violation of a statute do not necessarily
constitute a
45
false or fraudulent claim under the FCA.
More importantly, however, the Fifth Circuit also held that
the FCA applies in cases in which false representations are employed to obtain government privileges or services. 46 Therefore,
when the government requires certified compliance with a statute or regulation as a condition of payment, a false claim is submitted if a claimant falsely certifies compliance with those
regulations. 47 This holding may validate Thompson's second allegation that a condition of Columbia's participation in the
Medicare program was the certification in annual cost reports
that the services identified in those reports were provided in
compliance with the laws and regulations relating to the provision of federal health care services. 48 Thompson argued that because Columbia violated the Medicare anti-kickback statute and
the Stark laws, Columbia's certifications of compliance on its
annual cost reports were false and amounted to a false claim
under the FCA.49
Columbia argued that because Medicare claims are typically
submitted shortly after furnishing services, certification of compliance in annual cost reports was not a prerequisite to Medicare payments.-" Thompson retorted that certification of
compliance in the annual cost reports is a prerequisite to payment because retention of Medicare payments received prior to
the submission of annual cost reports is conditioned upon the
certification of compliance contained in those reports. 51 The
Fifth Circuit was unable to determine from the record the extent
to which certifications of compliance in annual cost reports constituted a prerequisite to Medicare payment and remanded the
43. See id. at 901.
44. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938
F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
45. See Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902.
46. See id. at 903.
47. See id. at 902.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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case to the district court with instructions to make this determination. 2 The court also instructed the district court to consider
Thompson's assertion that claims for services rendered in violation of the Stark laws are also false and fraudulent claims under
the FCA. 53 Thompson argued that because Stark expressly prohibits payment for services rendered in violation of its terms,
such claims are necessarily false and fraudulent under the
FCA 4
This case has caused a great deal of concern in the provider
community because it suggests that simple errors contained in
annual cost reports could lead to substantial liability under the
FCA. The Fifth Circuit denied a subsequent motion for rehearing, 5 and the case is currently pending before the district court.
II.

ANTITRUST

1997 was an interesting, though relatively quiet, year on the
antitrust front, with mergers receiving most of the attention.
During 1997, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") employed innovative theories
to challenge hospital mergers;56 two for-profit titans battled over
a physician group merger in Mississippi; 57 and the DOJ and FTC
issued revisions to section IV of their Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.58
A.

Hospital Mergers

At the beginning of 1997, industry analysts suggested that the
enforcement agencies' success in stopping potentially anticompetitive hospital mergers in 1997 would be predicted by the final
disposition of the FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp. case. 59 Indeed, the FTC's defeat in Butterworth was indicative of the
Agencies' continued lack of success in challenging hospital
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
See id. at 903.
See id.
See United States ex rel. Thompson v. ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp., 1998

U.S. App. Lexis 2050 (5th Cir. 1998).
56.

See Jeffrey M. Teske, Antitrust Update 1 (Oct. 17, 1997) (unpublished update,

distributed with materials from Illinois Association of Healthcare Attorneys Fifteenth
Annual Health Law Symposium, on file with author).
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 6.
See id. at 10.
See Outlook '97, 6 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1, 4 (Jan. 2, 1997) (citing FTC v.

Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd, 7 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH)
71,863 (6th Cir. July 7, 1997)).
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mergers. The Butterworth case arose out of the FTC's objection
to the proposed merger of the two largest hospitals in Grand
Rapids, Michigan. 60 The FTC attempted to enjoin the merger
by asserting that the merger would "substantially lessen competition" in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.61
To make a prima facie case under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, the FTC must show that a proposed merger will produce an
entity that controls an undue percentage share of the relevant
market and will result in a significant increase in the entity's
concentration of power in the market.62 The relevant market
consists of two separate63 components, the product market and
the geographic market.
In Butterworth, the FTC attempted to utilize an innovative
definition of the product market. Faced with difficulties created
by a broader geographic market analysis in two previous cases,6 4
the FTC defined two relevant product markets in Butterworth:
the typical "acute inpatient hospital care" market and the more
narrow "primary care inpatient hospital services" market.65 The
FTC established its prima facie case by convincing the court to
accept both proffered product market definitions and by showing that the concentration levels resulting from the proposed
merger were potentially anticompetitive.66
By successfully establishing its prima facie case, the FTC created a presumption that the proposed merger would create an
entity that controlled an undue percentage share of the two relevant markets.67 The district court, however, held that the defendants successfully rebutted the presumption of anticompetitiveness, 68 and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court in a short, unpublished per curiam opinion.69 Therefore, although the court adopted the FTC's market
60. See Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1286.
61. See Outlook '97, supra note 59, at 6.
62. See Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1289.
63. See id. at 1290.
64. See Teske, supra note 56, at 2 (citing FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260 (8th
Cir. 1995), and United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa
1995), vacated, 1997-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 71,729 (8th Cir. 1997)).
65. See Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1290.
66. See id. at 1294.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1302.
69. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 71,863 (6th
Cir. July 7 , 1997).
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definition, the agency's effort to enjoin the merger proved
unsuccessful.
After the Sixth Circuit's affirmative ruling, the FTC
threatened to proceed with an administrative challenge to the
merger. This tactic elicited an interesting congressional response.7 ° There was an attempt in Congress to attach a rider to
the appropriations bill governing the FTC's funding that would
have explicitly prohibited any spending on an administrative
challenge in the Butterworth case. 71 When the proposed budgetary restriction came before the Senate, the Senate Judiciary
Committee held hearings on the issue.72 These hearings raised
several interesting issues, including the fairness of the enforcement agencies' ability to challenge proposed mergers both judicially and administratively. 73 Soon after the hearings ended, the
FTC backed away from an administrative challenge. 4
The DOJ also used an innovative product market definition in
United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center.75 This case
concerned the DOJ's objection to the proposed merger of two
large hospitals near New York City. 76 The DOJ argued that the
relevant product market consisted of "the bundle of acute inpatient services provided by anchor hospitals to managed care
plans. ' 77 The DOJ asserted that the two hospitals attempting to
merge, North Shore Manhasset and Long Island Jewish Medical
Center, were competing to be the "anchor" hospital that served
Queens and Nassau counties in any managed care plan's hospital network. 78 The agency asserted that anchor hospitals are
highly
those "having prestigious reputations, broad ranging and
79
sophisticated services, and high quality medical staffs.
The district court rejected the government's approach, holding that its proffered product market definition was unduly restrictive and that it did not comport with the typical product
market definition used in other cases, namely "general acute in70.

See Teske, supra note 56, at 4.

71.
72.
73.
74.

See
See
See
See

75.
1997).
76.
77.
78.
79.

id.
id.
id.
id.

United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y.
See id. at 123.
See id. at 137.
See id. at 137-38.
See id.
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patient services. '"80 The court also noted that the government
failed to establish that the acute inpatient services produced at
the "anchor hospitals" were unique
and would support a sepa81
rate relevant product market.
B.

Physician Groups

In addition to hospital mergers, physician group mergers also
drew attention in 1997. The most noteworthy item in this area
came from a battle between Columbia/HCA and Quorum
Health Group in Mississippi.
In HTI Health Services, Inc. v. Quorum Health Group, Inc.,82
Columbia Vicksburg Medical Center, a subsidiary of Columbia/
HCA, challenged the proposed merger of the two largest physician clinics in Vicksburg, Mississippi.8 3 Quorum was the indirect
majority shareholder of River Region Medical Corporation
("RRMC"), and the proposed merger would have made the two
physician groups shareholders of RRMC.84 In its complaint, Columbia first argued that the proposed merger would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition
in Vicksburg's physician, hospital, and managed care markets.85
Second, Columbia claimed that Quorum violated Section 2 of
the Sherman Act by conspiring to monopolize Vicksburg's physician and hospital services with 6"the specific intent of making
8
Vicksburg a one hospital town.
Columbia asserted two main arguments to support its Clayton
Act claim. Relying on the hospital merger cases, Columbia first
argued that the merger would create excessively high postmerger market shares and thus should be presumed illegal
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 87 The district court, however, distinguished the hospital merger cases by noting that the
extensive regulation of hospitals creates a significant barrier to
entry for new competitors that does not exist in the Vicksburg
physician marketplace. 88 Columbia also argued that the physi80. See id.
81. See id.
82. HTI Health Services, Inc. v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104
(S.D. Miss. 1997).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 1108.
85. See id. at 1110.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 1133.
88. See id.
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cians would direct patients to the Quorum-owned Parkview hospital rather than the Columbia-owned Vicksburg Medical
Center.8 9 The court dismissed this claim, holding that patients
choose their own hospitals based on religious preference and
proximity to their physicians' offices. 90
In its Sherman Act claim, Columbia asserted that Quorum
representatives had expressed their desire to unify the Vicksburg medical community and essentially create a "one-hospital
town." 91 The court also rejected this claim, finding that the challenged merger was not the product of a concerted effort to monopolize.92 Rather, the court held that the merger was "the
natural byproduct of a rapidly evolving medical services
market." 93

The HTI decision indicates that because the barriers to entering the physician services market are typically lower than those
for the hospital inpatient services product market, the government may be required to show more significant post-merger
market share concentrations to warrant the finding of an antitrust violation. If the physician group merger trend persists, the
development of this area should continue generating interest in
the future.
C. Revision of Merger Guidelines

Another noteworthy merger development in 1997 was the issuance of revisions to section IV of the DOJ and the FTC's Horizontal Merger Guidelines.94 The revision deals with the
efficiencies created by mergers,95 and the new guidelines clearly
indicate that the agencies will focus on "merger-specific" efficiencies. 96 Specifically, the revision requires entities to substantiate efficiency claims in a manner that allows the agencies to
89. See id. at 1136.
90. See id. at 1137.
91. See id. at 1139.
92. See id. at 1140.
93. See id. at 1144.
94. See Teske, supra note 56, at 10.
95. "Efficiency" is a shorthand term for the economic principle of "allocative efficiency," which is the optimal allocation of societal resources producing maximum
benefit to the consumer. See Kenneth Laurence, Antitrust Laws and Health Care
Providers - Identifying and Reducing Antitrust Risks of Cooperative and Competitive
Activities, C557 ALI-ABA 301, 444 (1990).
96. See Teske, supra note 56, at 10 (stating that merger specific efficiencies are
those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to
be accomplished without it).
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reasonably verify the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted
efficiency, how and when each would be achieved, how each
would enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, and why each one would be merger-specific.97
III.

TAXATION ISSUES

Though some significant legislation was passed, tax-exempt
health care organizations will likely remember 1997 for the lack
of guidance provided by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").
Specifically, while Congress repealed the $150 million bond cap
on certain non-hospital bonds 98 and the IRS issued a revenue
ruling regarding physician recruitment, 99 the IRS did not issue
long-awaited guidance on intermediate sanctions and did not issue guidance on whole-hospital joint ventures until March 4,
1998.100
A.

Joint Ventures

In an attempt to penetrate new markets, for-profit hospital
chains have been acquiring, merging with, or entering into joint
ventures with tax-exempt hospitals. 10 1 In a typical whole-hospital joint venture, the tax-exempt organization contributes all or
nearly all of its assets to the joint venture entity in return for a
partnership interest. The for-profit entity also typically contributes assets or cash to the joint venture entity and receives a partnership interest. 10 2 The joint venture entity then operates the
hospital assets. 10 3 Although the last two Treasury-IRS business
plans have made issuance of guidance on whole-hospital joint
ventures a priority, the IRS did not issue specific guidlines until
March 4, 1998.1°4 Therefore, anxiety about potentially jeopard97. See id.
98. See Steven B. Kite & Robert L. Capizzi, $150 Million Non-Hospital Bond
Limitation Eliminatedfor New Capital Expenditures, 6 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1287

(Aug. 14, 1997).
99. See Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-18 I.R.B.
100. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B.
101. See T.J. Sullivan, Tax-Exemption Developments 1 (Oct. 17, 1997) (unpublished update, distributed with materials from Illinois Association of Healthcare Attorneys Fifteenth Annual Health Law Symposium, on file with author).
102.
103.
104.

See id.
See id.
See id.
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izing the tax-exempt status of an exempt partner was a major
concern in 1997.105
Before the official guidelines were issued, the Exempt Organizations Division ("EOD") of the IRS dropped hints in 1997
about the agency's position on this issue.10 6 Speaking at the National Symposium on Health Care Enforcement, Marcus Owens,
the director of the EOD, advised practitioners to take a close
look at the Service's unfavorable exemption ruling in Redlands
0 7
Surgical Services v. Commissioner.1
Redlands involved a joint
venture between a for-profit hospital and a tax-exempt hospital
system. The tax-exempt system created a subsidiary to hold a
partnership interest in a surgery center. 08 The Service denied
the subsidiary exempt status, because a charitable entity did not
have a "meaningful ability" to control the partnership and the
surgical center did not operate in a charitable manner.10 9
Commentators have noted that the facts in Redlands are similar to a whole-hospital joint venture situation, 110 and the Service's denial letter provides insight into how the agency is likely
to address whole-hospital joint ventures."' The issue of "control" was central to the Service's analysis in Redlands, because
the subsidiary assumed the liability of a general partner without
possessing the commensurate ability to control the partnership." 2 This decision is consistent with other cases in which the
Service has addressed ventures between tax-exempt and forprofit entities." 3 In Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v. Commissioner,114 for example, the IRS granted exemption because the
exempt organization controlled the joint venture. 1 5 In Housing
Pioneers, Inc. v. Commissioner,116 however, an exemption was
105. See id.; see also Carolyn D. Wright & Fred Stokeld, IRS Cheated EOS on
Guidance in 1997; Here's Hoping for a Better '98, 78 TAX NOTES 33, 34 (1998).
106. Precedential Guidance, Federal Court Actions Among 'Coming Attractions,'
IRS Official Says, Health Care Daily (BNA) Feb. 26, 1998, available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNAHLT File.
107. Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner, No. 11025-97 (T.C. 1997).
108. See Carolyn D. Wright & Fred Stokeld, IRS Officials Exempt Bond Compliance Projects, 77 TAx NOTES 660, 661 (1997).
109. See Carolyn D. Wright, Sullivan: IRS Denial Letter Offers Clues For Whole
HospitalJ/Vs, EXEMPT. ORG TAX REV., Dec. 1997, at 186, 186.
110. See Wright & Stokeld, supra note 108, at 660.
111. See Wright, supra note 109, at 186.
112. See id.
113. See Wright & Stokeld, supra note 108, at 660.
114. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980).
115. See id.
116. T.C.M. (RIA) J 93, 120 at 527 (1993).
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denied because the charitable organization did not exercise significant control over the joint venture.117
The recently promulgated Revenue Ruling 98-15 seems to
comport with the Service's stance in Redlands.1 8 The main issue continues to be control. Revenue Ruling 98-15 presents two
different scenarios setting forth radically different methods of
operation for a limited liability company ("LLC") resulting
from a whole-hospital joint venture.1 19 In the first scenario, the
nonprofit entity retains control.12 0 For example, the governing
documents mandate that three of the LLC's five governing
board members are chosen by the nonprofit partner and that the
hospital owned by the LLC be operated in a manner that furthers charitable purposes.12 1 The Service said that this arrangement properly demonstrated that the nonprofit entity
maintained control over changes in activities, disposition of assets, and renewal of management contracts.122 Therefore, the
nonprofit partner could ensure that the LLC was used to further
charitable purposes, and tax-exempt status would be allowed for
the LLC.
The second scenario presents a circumstance in which the forprofit entity retains substantial control, and the joint venture
would not be granted tax-exempt status. In this example, the
LLC's governing board is composed of three nonprofit appointees and three for-profit appointees. 23 Furthermore, the firm
providing management services is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the for-profit entity. 124 Finally, under the second scenario, the
LLC's governing documents provide that the LLC's governing
board needs only a majority vote to approve annual budgets,
earnings distributions, and selection of important executives. 25
The Service noted that the governing documents under these
facts lack a "binding obligation" for the LLC to operate in a
charitable manner. 126 The Service also emphasized that the nonprofit partner in this example would be unable to "initiate programs" within the LLC to address new health needs without the
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 532.
Wright & Stokeld, supra note 108, at 660.
Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6.
id.
id.
id. at 9.
id. at 7.
id.
id.
id. at 9.
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agreement from at least one appointee of the for-profit partner.127 Therefore, just as the Service stressed in Redlands, the
nonprofit partner must retain substantial control over an entity
created through a joint venture with a for-profit partner to ensure that the nonprofit partner retains its tax exempt status.
B.

Intermediate Sanctions

The IRS also failed to issue long-awaited guidance on the intermediate sanction authority created by the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 2 in 1996.128 Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") section
4958 imposes a penalty excise tax on a "disqualified person"
who improperly benefits from an "excess benefit transaction"
with a not-for-profit section 501(c)(3) health care organization
or a section 501(c)(4) tax-exempt health maintenance organization. 129 Intermediate sanction authority is significant because it
gives the IRS the ability to punish violations of the tax-exemption laws without revoking an organization's tax-exempt status.
The IRC recognizes two types of "disqualified persons"
against whom intermediate sanctions can be levied: "insiders"
who benefit from the transaction and "organizational managers"
who knowingly participate in the improper transaction.13 "Insiders" are individuals who are or who have recently been in a
position to exercise substantial influence over the tax-exempt
organization. 31 "Organizational managers" are officers, directors, trustees, or any other individuals with similar powers or
responsibilities.132 Though official regulations are still pending,
a House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee report
on intermediate sanctions stated that, as a general proposition,
physicians would only be classified as "insiders" if they1exercise
"substantial control" over the tax-exempt organization. 33
A recent decision by the United States Tax Court may provide further insight into the way courts will define "disqualified
persons" under IRC section 4958. In United Cancer Council v.
127.
128.
1475-81
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
1181.

See id.
See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, §§ 1311-14, 110 Stat. 1452,
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1996)).
See I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1) (West 1998).
See I.R.C. § 4958(f) (West 1998).
See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1) (West 1998).
See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(2) (West 1998).
H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 58 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143,
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Commissioner,134 the court ruled that an outside fundraising
firm was an insider for purposes of the IRC private inurement
prohibition, because an agreement between the fundraising firm
and the tax-exempt entity gave the firm the ability to exercise
significant control over the charity's financial dealings. 135 As a
result of this decision, commentators have speculated that control or the ability to influence the tax-exempt organization will
be central to the determination of disqualified persons subject to
intermediate sanctions under section 4958.136
Although the IRS has promised the public that it will be "reasonable" in its intermediate sanction enforcement, industry experts urge tax-exempt health care organizations to take
proactive steps to avoid future problems. 137 For example, institutions have been advised to implement risk management programs to identify potentially disqualified persons and to review
all transactions and documents to ensure that they will not be
considered "excess benefit transactions.' ' 38 Finally, institutions
should implement a conflicts of interest policy that ensures that
all compensation arrangements and financial transactions with
disqualified persons are reasonable.13 9
C. Physician Recruitment
In 1997, the IRS did provide some guidance with respect to
physician recruitment incentives. Revenue Ruling 97-21 addressed the issue of whether a tax-exempt hospital violates the
requirements for exemption if it provides incentives for physicians to join its medical staff or to provide medical services to
the community. 140 The ruling contains five fact scenarios, only
one of which was held to imperil the hospital's tax-exempt
status.141
The ruling indicated that the hospital's required showing depends upon whether the hospital is recruiting the physician to
provide services for the hospital or merely to provide services
134. 109 T.C. 17 (1997).
135. See Alison Bennett, Cancer Charity's Loss of Exemption CarriesGreatSignificance for EOS, PractitionersSay, 6 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1884, 1885 (Dec. 11, 1997).
136. See id.
137. See Fred Stokeld, Get Ready for Intermediate Sanctions, McGovern Tells Exempts, EXEMPT ORG. TAx REV., Nov. 1997, at 200, 200.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 201.
140. See Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-18 I.R.B. 8; see also Wright & Stokeld, supra note
105 at 34.
141. See Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-18 I.R.B. 8, 9.
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on the physician's own behalf in the community served by the
hospital. 14 2 If a hospital recruits a physician to perform services
for or on behalf of the organization, the hospital must show that
the remuneration paid to the physician is reasonable compared
with the services performed. 143 Furthermore, all benefits conferred to the physician, including employment incentives, must
be included in the remuneration calculation. 144
In contrast, if the physician being recruited will provide services to the community, but not necessarily for or on behalf of the
organization, the exempt hospital's recruitment efforts must
meet four requirements. First, the tax-exempt entity may not
substantially engage in activities that do not further the hospital's exempt purposes or that do not bear a reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of those purposes. Second, the taxexempt entity must not engage in activities that result in the inurement of the hospital's net earnings to private individuals.
Third, the tax-exempt entity may not engage in any substantial
activity that causes it to be operated for the benefit of a private
interest. Finally, the tax-exempt
entity may not engage in any
1 45
substantial unlawful activity.
Revenue Ruling 97-21 appears to be good news for hospitals.
The Service seems to indicate that hospitals may provide significant recruitment incentives, as long as they are reasonable. For
example, the Revenue Ruling approves compensation packages
that included signing bonuses, payment of professional liability
insurance premiums for a limited time, payment of professional
liability insurance for a physician's former practice, provision of
office space in a hospital-owned building at below-market rates
for a limited period of time, moving expenses, and a guarantee
of a minimum level of private practice income for a limited period of time.146 The Ruling also indicates that compensation
packages must be in writing, negotiated at arms' length, and in
conformity with guidelines established by the hospital's board of
directors. 47 Finally, the Ruling suggests that remuneration
packages are presumed to be reasonable if they reflect regional
142. See id. at 10.
143. See Wright & Stokeld, supra note 105, at 34.
144. See Kelcy M. Whitman & Lee A. Morton, IRS Provides Guidance on Physician Recruitment by Hospitals, 28 TAx ADVISER 546, 546 (1997).
145. See id.
146. See Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-18 I.R.B. 8.
147. See id.
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or national surveys regarding income earned by physicians in
the same specialty.' 48
D. Repeal of the $150 Million Bond Cap
Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986,149 section 501(c)(3) organizations have been prohibited from being the beneficiaries of
more than $150 million in principal amount of tax-exempt bonds
used to finance non-hospital facilities during specified test periods. 150 Section 222 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 repealed
the $150 million cap with respect to bonds issued after August 5,
1997, as long as at least 95% of the proceeds from the issue are
151
used to finance capital expenditures incurred after that date.
Although the Taxpayer Relief Act certainly benefits section
501(c)(3) organizations that finance non-hospital facilities after
the enactment date, it does not address some significant
problems created by the $150 million cap. Currently, for example, the non-hospital bonds of organizations under common
management or control are aggregated for purposes of the $15052
million limit, and the new Act does not change this provision.
Furthermore, the Taxpayer Relief Act does not apply to outstanding tax-exempt bonds. 53 Therefore, not more than five
percent of the net proceeds of a bond issue can be used to finance working capital, costs of issuance, pre-enactment date
capital expenditures, and interest that is not capitalized. 54 The
Act also does not apply to bonds issued to refund tax-exempt or
taxable non-hospital bonds that were used to finance capital expenditures incurred prior to the enactment date. 155 Thus, while
the Act will certainly provide a major benefit to many section
501(c)(3) organizations in the future, it does not eradicate the
problems created by the initial bond cap, and further Congressional or regulatory action may be needed.
148. See id. at 8-9.
149. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1313(c), 100 Stat. 2085, 266364 (1986).
150. See Kite & Capizzi, supra note 98, at 1287.
151. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 222, 111 Stat. 788, 818
(1997) (adding I.R.C. § 145(b)(5)).
152. See Kite & Capizzi, supra note 98, at 1287.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY

[Vol. 7
ACT

OF

1974 ("ERISA")
1997 was business as usual in the complex and convoluted
world of ERISA. The statute, which was originally passed to
"protect . . .participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries,"' 156 has yet to be amended to address the realities
of the health care industry in the 1990s. Through its broad preemption provisions, ERISA continues to allow certain insurers
to avoid extracontractual and consequential damages by preempting state law and permitting beneficiaries to recover only
the benefits due under their health plans.
In 1997, the U. S. Supreme Court issued three preemption decisions, but it is unlikely that they will provide much clarity for
lower courts struggling with the scope of ERISA's preemption
provisions and attempting to formulate a standardized analytical
approach to preemption cases. Lower courts began testing the
limits of ERISA's alternative civil enforcement provisions in
1997 and continued to appeal for congressional action to realign
ERISA's original intent with the realities of the current health
care market.
A.

U.S. Supreme Court Decisions

The U.S. Supreme Court decided four ERISA cases in 1997,
three of which focused on ERISA's preemption clause. 157 Since
ERISA's enactment, the Court has struggled with ERISA preemption in sixteen cases. 158 With limited exceptions, section 514
of ERISA generally preempts any state law that "relates to"
ERISA-covered employee benefit plans. 159 This preemption
provision effectively shields some insurance plans from liability
under state law by removing actions to federal court and limiting recovery to the amount that would have been paid had serv160
ices been rendered.
In the first preemption case, California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction,161 a unani156. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1994).
157. See Susan M. Kayser, The Pre-emption Problem, CONN. L. TRIB., July 21,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
158.

See id.

159. See Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 514, 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994)).
160. See Kayser, supra note 157.
161. 117 S.Ct. 832 (1997).
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mous Court ruled that ERISA did not preempt California's
journeyman prevailing wage law, because the state law does not
"make reference" to ERISA plans. 62 In the second, Boggs v.
Boggs,'163 a sharply divided Court held that Louisiana's community property law conflicted with ERISA and was therefore preempted. 64 In the Court's final preemption case of 1997, De
1 65
Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund,
trustees of a trust fund established to administer an ERISA plan
sought a declaration that ERISA preempted a New York State
tax on the gross receipts of health care facilities operated by the
fund. 166 In a seven-to-two opinion, the Court held that the "relate to" language in ERISA's preemption clause was not intended to supplant state law and that a hospital operated by an
ERISA plan is subject to the same laws as other hospitals. 67
These three preemption cases afforded the Court an opportunity to clarify some of the longstanding problems created by
ERISA, but the opinions failed to provide lower courts with
meaningful guidance on the scope of the preemption clause or
the appropriate method of preemption analysis. 68 In De Buono
and California Division of Labor Standards, the two cases in
which the Court held that the state laws were not preempted,
the majority opinions emphasized that the state laws at issue
dealt with matters traditionally left within the purview of the
states. 169 The testamentary transfer in Boggs, however, also
dealt with issues traditionally left to the state.170 Furthermore,
the analysis employed in De Buono and California Division of
Labor Standards focused on the extent to which the state laws at
issue "related to" an ERISA plan.'
In Boggs, however, the
Court did not use a "relate to" analysis; it simply determined
that the state law conflicted with ERISA and was, therefore,
162. See id. at 842 (reasoning that ERISA did not preempt the prevailing wage
law because the law functions irrespective of ERISA's existence and does not "have a
connection with" or "relate to" ERISA plans).
163. 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
164. See id. at 1763 (ruling that a deceased wife's testamentary transfer to her
children of her community property interest in her husband's undistributed retirement benefits is preempted by ERISA).
165. 117 S.Ct. 1747 (1997).
166. See id. at 1749.
167. See id. at 1752.
168. See Kayser, supra note 157.
169. See id.
170. See id. (Justice Breyer noted in his dissent that property rights and probate
matters "are also areas of traditional and important state concern").
171. See id.
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preempted. 17 2 With this paucity of guidance, variance among
the lower courts is destined to proliferate, and the Court certainly will be faced with more ERISA preemption issues in the
near future.
B. Managed Care - Breach of Fiduciary Duty
As the Supreme Court continued to struggle with ERISA preemption, lower courts began testing the limits of ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions. For example, in September, the Massachusetts Superior Court ruled in Nascimento v. Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc.,1 73 that ERISA did not preempt a
patient's state law claims of medical malpractice against her
physician and HMO. The court held that most of the patient's
claims 174 did not "relate to" an ERISA plan, because reference
to the plan was not necessary to resolve claims as to whether the
patient's care was consistent with the
care an average, qualified
175
practitioner would have provided.
Nascimento was one of eight cases in which the U.S. Department of Labor filed amicus briefs contending that ERISA
should not preempt state law medical malpractice claims regarding an HMO's alleged misconduct in the delivery of medical
care. 176 The Department argued that malpractice law does not
mandate the structure or administration of benefit plans but
simply sets forth liability for actions taken by corporate entities
engaged in the business of arranging and delivering medical care
77
for a fee.1
78
Another important case in this area was Shea v. Esensten.1
In Shea, the decedent suffered from chest pains and requested
that his primary physician refer him to a specialist. 79 The physician convinced Mr. Shea that he did not need a referral, and Mr.
Shea subsequently died. 80 Mr. Shea was unaware that his
172. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1763 (1997).
173. No. 94-2534 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 1997).
174. See Benefit Plan Law Does Not Supersede Claims of Medical Malpractice by
HMO, Health Care Daily (BNA), Nov. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAHLT File.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
179. See id. at 626.
180. See id.
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HMO's contract with its preferred doctors created financial incentives designed to minimize referrals. 181
Mr. Shea's widow initially brought a wrongful death action in
Minnesota state court. The HMO removed the case to federal
court by successfully arguing that ERISA preempted her state
law claim.' 82 Mrs. Shea amended her complaint and alleged that
the HMO's undisclosed efforts to reduce referrals violated its
fiduciary duties under ERISA 83 The Eighth Circuit agreed
and held that an HMO's failure to disclose financial incentives
not to refer patients to a specialist gave rise to a cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty. 184 Although the court did not specify the types of available damages, this case illustrates the backlash against managed care plans, particularly in light of the
protection these plans have received from ERISA preemption
in the past.
C. A Plea for CongressionalAction
Courts have desperately attempted to take equitable action in
ERISA preemption cases, but the broad preemption language
often forces them to shield the arrangers and payers of health
care from the legitimate state law claims of wronged beneficiaries by removing the claims to federal court. In Bast v. Prudential Insurance Company, 85 for example, the beneficiary, Mrs.
Bast, was diagnosed with breast cancer in 1990 and underwent a
left modified radical mastectomy. 86 In August, 1991, she was
diagnosed with "secondary malignancy neo-lung," and her
oncologist determined that her only chance for survival was a
procedure known as HDC/ABMT, which uses high doses of
1 87
chemotherapy in conjunction with a bone marrow transplant.
Prudential first denied coverage for the removal of Mrs. Bast's
bone marrow for processing and storage, and then denied coverage for the bone marrow transplant because the company con1 88
sidered the procedure to be "investigational or experimental.'
Six months after her initial request for treatment, and three
181. See id. at 627.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 629.
185. No. 97-35429 (9th Cir., appellants' brief filed Sept. 2, 1997).
186. See Family Argues Against ERISA Preemption in Suit Over Transplant Coverage, HEALTH L. LITIG. REP., Oct. 1997, at 9.
187. See id.
188. See id.
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months after the recommended period for receiving the treatment, a letter from Mrs. Bast's attorney convinced Prudential to
approve the procedure. 189 Unfortunately, by this time, Mrs.
Bast's cancer had metastasized into her brain, and she was no
longer eligible for the procedure. 190 She passed away in January,
1993.191
Mrs. Bast's family sued Prudential, and during the trial in
Washington state federal district court, Prudential admitted that
it acted in bad faith by initially delaying authorization for the
procedure and denying coverage for the bone marrow transplant. 192 However, the district court granted Prudential's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with
prejudice, holding that ERISA allows recovery only for the cost
of the requested treatment. 193 The case is currently on appeal
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Another case, Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Insurance Company, 9 4 illustrates the frustrations experienced by courts faced
with the unjust and absurd consequences of ERISA's preemption clause. In Andrews-Clarke, the insured was admitted to a
hospital for alcohol detoxification. 195 Although the insurance
policy provided for one thirty-day rehabilitation program per
year, the insurance company's utilization review agent, Mr.
Greenspring, only approved a five-day stay. 1 96 After this brief
stay, the insured resumed drinking and then admitted himself to
another hospital. 197 This time, the utilization review agent only
authorized an eight-day inpatient stay. 198 After his second hospitalization, the insured ingested large quantities of drugs and
alcohol and attempted suicide.1 99 Mr. Greenspring would not
authorize payment for a court-ordered rehabilitation program in
a private facility, so the insured was sent to a correctional facility where he received little treatment and was sexually abused
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
Amicus Claims Establishing a Trust Is Appropriate ERISA Remedy,
MANAGED CARE LITIG. REP., Oct. 24, 1997, at 5.
194. 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
195. See Court's ERISA Preemption Ruling Fuels Fire for New Claims Rules,
MANAGED CARE WEEK, Nov. 24, 1997, at 24.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
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by another inmate. 200 After his release from the correctional facility, the insured committed suicide.2° '
The decedent's wife sued the insurance company for breach of
contract and several other state law claims. The lawsuit was removed to federal court, and because the court held that the
claims "related to" an ERISA plan, the Massachusetts district
court was forced to dismiss the claims.2 2 In a passionate opinion, Judge Young noted that when ERISA was enacted, most
disputes between insurance companies and beneficiaries arose
when the insurance company denied reimbursement for health
care the beneficiary had already received.20 3 In today's era of
managed care, however, a denial of coverage often translates
into a denial of needed health care, and ERISA effectively
shields insurers from liability stemming from the denial.
Judge Young also chastised Congress for not amending ERISA to reflect the current state of modern health care.20 4 The
judge concluded the opinion by writing:
Although the alleged conduct of Travelers and Greenspring in
this case is extraordinarily troubling, even more disturbing to
this court is the failure of Congress to amend a statute that,
due to the changing realities of the modern health care system,
has gone conspicuously awry from its original intent.
Does anyone
care?
20 5
Do you?
Perhaps someone is listening. Currently, three separate bills
are percolating through Congress which would make significant
changes to ERISA. Two of the bills would end ERISA preemption with respect to state causes of action for personal injury or
wrongful death,20 6 and the third would make managed care
group health plans accountable for the failure to provide health
benefits due to improper cost-driven policy decisions.20 7
V.

CONCLUSION

In 1997, the individuals driving the health care industry's development (consumers, providers, payors, and attorneys) contin200.

See id.

201.

See id.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D. Mass 1997).
See id. at 58.
See id. at 53.
See id. at 65.
See H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997).
See H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. (1997).
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ued their attempt to strike that elusive balance between optimal
care and optimal price. An industry that is awash in money and
regulation naturally tends towards rapid evolution, and 1998 will
undoubtedly bring new statutes, new regulations, new interpretations, and new challenges. So, stay tuned, health care enthusiasts, because the ride is far from over.
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